Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 3
These developments can also be seen amongst Parliamentarian infantry. At the successful storming of Arundel in December 1643, by Sir William Waller’s Parliamentarian army, Colonel Birch, having crossed the Royalist’s first line of fortifications, received a counter-attack. The account of what happened was written by Birch’s secretary and addressed directly to him:
At this instant, the enemy spending their shot at too great a distance, your order was to horse and foote instantly to assault the enemy; your selfe with cheerfull speech assureing they would not stand, which proved accordinglie. For the enemy, feeling the force of shott poured on them with three ranks at a time, after short time gave ground, and your selfe entered the towne with them.36
It is also interesting to note that the enemy was considered to have fired at too great a range.
At the first battle of Newbury, 1643, the Blew Regiment of the London Trained Bands was attacked by two regiments of Royalist cavalry. What happened was described by a Sergeant Foster in the Red Regiment. ‘Two regiments of the Kings Horse which stood upon their right flanke a far off, came fiercely upon them, and charged them two or three times, but were beat back with their Muskettiers, who gave them a most desperate charge, and made them flie.’37 Foster’s own regiment was similarly attacked:
Then two regiments of the enemies horse, which stood upon our right Flank, came fiercely upon us, and so surrounded us, that we were forced to charge upon them in the front and reere, and both Flanks, which was performed by us with a great deal of courage and undauntedness of spirit, insomuch that wee made a great slaughter among them, and forced them to retreat.38
These accounts make it clear that after Edgehill there was a fairly immediate and dramatic change in the way that first the Royalist infantry and then the Parliamentarian infantry delivered their fire. Fire was reserved to a range of the length of a pike or two, which is five to ten yards, and then delivered by three ranks firing together. In the case of infantry on the offensive this was followed by an immediate assault. This change proved effective not only in the case of attacking other infantry, but also defensively against cavalry.
In Yorkshire the Parliamentarian forces were commanded by Lord Fairfax, and the infantry, in contrast to other Civil War armies, seem to have mainly consisted of musketeers.39 Why Lord Fairfax’s infantry was mainly made up of musketeers is not known, however many of the battles and skirmishes fought in the north of England were characterised by the presence of enclosures and hedges. It might simply be that these would hamper attempts by pikemen to close to hand-to-hand combat and consequently more reliance was laid on musketry. Whatever the explanation, the experiences of this army can demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of firepower during the Civil War. At the battle of Adwalton Moor in June, 1643, Fairfax’s infantry seems to have totalled some four thousand musketeers. In contrast the Royalist army commanded by the Earl of Newcastle had about the same number of infantry, but only half were musketeers, the rest being pikemen.40 The Royalists had a considerable advantage in cavalry.41 Initially the Parliamentarian musketeers, fighting from hedge to hedge and through enclosures, gradually gained the upper hand. Newcastle started to give orders to retreat, but at this point the Royalists launched a counter-attack with a large body of pikemen that turned the tide of the battle. The reason for the success of this body of pikemen in amongst hedges and enclosures and against musketeers is not clear. The most likely explanation comes from Joseph Lister:
But there was one major Jefferies keeper of the ammunition, who proving treacherous, and withholding it from the parliament men; who calling for it and being able to get none, were forced to slacken their firing, which the enemy perceiving, and very likely having private intelligence of, presently faced about, and fell upon Fairfax’s men with that fury that they soon regained their guns, and put them to the rout, slaying many of them.42
How the musketeers delivered their fire in this battle is not clear from the accounts. However, what is clear is that the Parliamentarian musketeers were able to achieve superiority over their opponents and to neutralise any threat from the Royalist pikemen while they had an adequate supply of ammunition. It also suggests that a system for resupplying ammunition in battle was in place, but on this occasion broke down. A similar event happened at the battle of Tadcaster in December of 1642 when, after successfully holding off Newcastle’s forces, Fairfax was forced to withdraw under cover of night for want of ammunition.43 Whether or not there was treachery at Adwalton, these incidents do emphasise the importance of the supply of ammunition and the difficulty of resupply on the battlefield.
As with Adwalton, other accounts of the fighting in the north of England provide little evidence of how the musketeers from this region fought. They are commonly described as fighting from hedge to hedge, which may indicate that firepower alone was frequently relied on, with little hand-to-hand combat. Although there is no indication of how that fire was delivered, without the option of hand-to-hand combat to finish off an opponent already shaken in a firefight, the firepower element alone had to have been effective enough to decide the outcome. The Parliamentarian musketeers at least were capable of holding their fire in defence in order to produce decisive firepower. At Tadcaster Sir Thomas Fairfax recorded how ‘Our Men reserv’d their shot, till they came near, which they did then dispose of to so good purpose, that the Enemy was forced to retire, and shelter themselves behind the Hedges.’44 They were, however, also involved in the storming of a number of towns, where hand-to-hand combat is implicit in the accounts. At the storming of Leeds, ‘The business was hotly disputed for almost two Hours; but the Enemy being beaten from their Works, and the Barricado’s into the Streets forced open, the Horse and Foot resolutely entered, and the Soldiers cast down their Arms, and rendered themselves Prisoners.’45 At the storming of Wakefield Sir Thomas Fairfax recalled that ‘after an Hour’s dispute, the Foot forced open a Barricado, where I entered with my own Troop.’46 From this it would appear that while the nature of the terrain in the north of England affected the way battles were fought there was an understanding of the need for musket fire to be delivered at close range in order to produce effective firepower and that this had to be combined with a readiness to engage in hand-to-hand combat to achieve a decision when necessary.
Unfortunately there is little evidence concerning the performance of Lord Fairfax’s infantry at the battle of Marston Moor in 1644; after an initial success they mostly ran away. Five armies were engaged in that battle, which followed the raising of the siege of York. There were two Royalist armies: the Earl of Newcastle’s, which had been defending York, and Prince Rupert’s, which had raised the siege. Opposed to them were the two Parliamentarian armies of Lord Fairfax and the Earl of Manchester, and, allied with the Parliamentarians, a Scots army; that had all been besieging York.47 What is evident about Marston Moor is that it was a particularly bloody affair. It lasted only an hour and a half, perhaps two, but well over four thousand were killed, mostly Royalist infantry. The language of the accounts reflects this ferocity and violence. One of Cromwell’s officers described ‘thinking the victory wholly ours and nothing to be done but to kill and take prisoners’.48 Another eyewitness of many battles wrote: ‘This victory was one of the greatest and most bloody since the warre begane.’49 These comments, the high casualties and the brevity of the battle when compared to Edgehill could be a reflection of the change in infantry fire tactics since the start of the war.
At one point in the battle, part of the Scots infantry came under considerable pressure. The cavalry of the Royalist left wing
assaulted the Scottish Foot upon their Flancks, so that they had the Foot upon their front and the whole Cavalry of the enemies left wing to fight with, whom they encountered with so much courage and resolution, that having enterlined their Musquetiers with Pikemen they made the enemies Horse, notwithstanding for all the assistance they had of their foot, at two severall assaults to give ground.50
The significance of t
his description is that this appears to be one of only two instances of infantry interlining pikemen and musketeers to defend against cavalry, the other being at Edgehill. The general response to a cavalry attack seems to have been to deliver close-range volley fire sufficient to drive off or at least halt the cavalry’s attack. Once cavalry have stopped moving they are, as individuals, vulnerable to the infantry who will almost always have greater numbers.
In Scotland evidence of similar fire tactics to those developed in England can be found. At the battle of Tippermuir in 1644, Montrose, the Royalist commander, was facing a larger enemy and was in danger of being outflanked. He instructed his infantry accordingly.
He caused his Army to be drawne out to as open an order as could be possible, and makes his Files onely three deep. He commands the Ranks all to discharge at once, those in the first Ranke kneeling, in the second stooping, and in the hindmost, where he placed the tallest men, upright; he chargeth them also to have a care of mis-spending their powder, of which they had so small store, and that they should not so much as make a shot till they came to the very teeth of their enemies; & as soone as they had discharged their muskets once a piece, immediately to breake in upon the enemy with their swords & musket ends; which if they did, he was very confident the enemy would never endure the charge.51
Whilst six ranks were necessary for sustained fire, three ranks were the maximum that could be fired together in a single volley. Montrose has here made a virtue of necessity, the three-deep line firing in a single volley at close range maximising the fire of his infantry while also extending his line to avoid being outflanked and conserving powder by avoiding a prolonged musketry engagement. The delivery of the fire was then to be followed by an immediate assault. The result was a victory for Montrose.
At the battle of Inverlochy, 1645, the Royalist left wing of Montrose’s army was commanded by Colonel Occaen. He ordered his musketeers to hold their fire to close range, which they did, ignoring the enemy’s fire until ‘they fyred there beardes’, which made ‘a cruell havoke’. They then promptly attacked with their swords and targes, disordering and dispersing the enemy.52 Here again the fire was maximised by firing at very close range, followed by an immediate assault. Once again, these tactics resulted in a Royalist victory. It would appear that the adoption of developing maximum firepower at close range followed by a rapid assault was a nationwide development.
The battle of Naseby, fought in 1645, provided clear evidence of the use of both brief, short-range volleys in the assault and the use of lower-intensity firing when the situation required it. The Royalist army, led by Charles I in person, took the offensive although outnumbered, and marched towards the Parliamentarian army, the newly raised New Model Army commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax. In the centre the position of the Parliamentarian infantry, drawn back from the edge of a slight ridge, meant that the infantry regiments lost sight of each other as they closed. The Royalist Sir Edward Walker wrote: ‘The Foot on either side hardly saw each other until they were within Carabine Shot, and so only made one Volley; ours falling in with Sword and butt end of the Musquet did notable Execution.’53 According to the Parliamentarian John Rushworth, ‘the Foot charged not each other till they were within twelve paces one of another, and could not charge above twice, but were at push of Pike.’54 If the Royalists fired a single volley before closing to hand to hand it seems likely that they had reduced their musketeers from six ranks to three. To stay in six ranks would have meant the rear three ranks could not have fired, a considerable waste of firepower. Additionally, going into three ranks would have lengthened the frontage of the Royalist units, thus better matching the frontage of the numerically superior front line of the New Model Army. The New Model Army was formed on a constricted front and with little space between the front-line regiments would not have been able to copy the Royalist formation.55 It is possible that the New Model fired by three ranks twice, thus producing the two ‘charges’ or volleys recorded by Rushworth. Clearly both armies were capable of and prepared to use firing in three ranks at close range to maximise their firepower immediately before hand-to-hand combat.
During the battle the New Model Army’s infantry commander, Major General Skippon, was shot at close range, apparently ‘by one of his own Souldiers in wheeling off’.56 This seems to have occurred at a point after the initial contact and when Skippon was bringing forward reserves to counter the Royalist’s initial success, most likely during the period of an extended exchange of fire suggested by archaeological evidence.57 If that was the case it would appear that firing by ranks was in use at this point, presumably because the Royalists had run out of momentum and the New Model Army was recovering from its initial setback. Neither side was in a position to try to force the issue and so both resorted to low-intensity, but sustainable firing. Ultimately the New Model was victorious and Naseby was followed by a series of successes as it campaigned from Northamptonshire to Cornwall, finally bringing the First Civil War to an end at Oxford in 1646.
The tactics used by the New Model Army and their capability with them are summed up in a letter written by Cromwell about the battle of Preston during the Second Civil War fought in 1648. ‘There came no band of your foot to fight that day but did it with incredible valour and resolution . . . they often coming to push of pike and close firing, and always making the enemy to recoil.’58
There are few descriptions of English Civil War engagements that are sufficiently detailed to allow an analysis of how firepower was delivered and how that delivery developed. Many speak of hedge fights and driving the enemy from hedge to hedge, but without any explanation of the techniques involved. Many engagements were protracted affairs, which raises questions about the supply and conservation of ammunition in battle. However, some further evidence of changes in the way fire was delivered can be found by comparing the military manuals of William Barriffe and Richard Elton, Barriffe being pre-war and Elton post-war. Elton described much the same firing manoeuvres as Barriffe, but based his descriptions on a company with a 2:1 ratio of musketeers to pikemen and files six men deep, rather than Barriffe’s 1:1 in files eight deep, which indicates that there had been both an increased reliance on firepower and an increased rate of fire. He prefaced his descriptions with a comment on the variety of firings suggesting that not all of them were considered to be practical for the battlefield.
I shall therefore for the good of my Country, and for the benefit of all such as are herein concerned, collect forth some firings, which shall be every one differing from the other in one kind or other, either in the execution or reducing, whereby the ingenious Souldier may cull forth such as he best likes to make use of, what he shall think to be most fit and pertinent to his intended purpose, be it either for delight or service.
Figure 2.2: An infantry company drawn up according to Elton.
Source: Elton, Compleat Body, p. 16.
He then went on to describe forty-five different ways of firing that do not differ from Barriffe except in the number of ranks.59
However, while the main body of his text remained unaltered, Elton made an important addition to the second edition of his book in 1659. This amounts to four unnumbered pages added to the very end. First he gives the drill movements for the matchlock musket without the musket rest. In doing so he was reflecting a change that came about during the wars, which was the rest’s abandonment. It is difficult to be sure when this happened, it was probably a gradual, piecemeal process, but when the New Model Army was being fitted out in the winter of 1644–5 no musket rests were supplied to it. This change undoubtedly speeded up the process of loading a musket as the musketeer had one less piece of equipment to juggle. It may also indicate that muskets had become lighter, although there is no evidence to suggest that the design of muskets changed during the wars.
Elton also wrote in this section: ‘I have thought good to set down the plain way of exercising a company, as usually it is practised in the Army’, that is during the 1650s.60 He went o
n:
We usually fire in the Front sometimes two Rancks standing, the rest passing by turns, then standing after they have gained the ground before their Leaders do fire, till all have fiered twice; other times three Rancks fire together the first kneels down, the second stoops; the third stands upright, then falling down, the three last Rancks pass through; and do the like.
Whether firing one, two or three ranks the idea of ranks filing off down the side of their unit to the rear to reload seems to have been abandoned. Instead all the firing appears to have been by introduction with musketeers moving in the gaps between files. Furthermore the musketeers reloaded where they fired while the musketeers who were loaded moved past them, further reducing the loading time. These then stood and fired immediately in front of those who had just fired, there was no advancing ten or twenty paces to fire, which reduced the time between volleys. Elton also seems to be saying that the distance between the files of musketeers was ‘order’, half that stated by Barriffe as necessary for firing by introduction. This would have had the effect of concentrating the fire over a narrower frontage.61 What is just as important is what is not there. Firing by two ranks advanced and by forlorn files have disappeared. Instead the firing by ranks was carried out in a much brisker manner and the aggressive firing by three ranks had become normal practice.
While the developments in firing methods enumerated by Elton in his 1659 edition appear to have increased the rate of fire of a body of musketeers, he did not approve of all attempts to do so. He was insistent ‘that the Souldiers present and give fire upon their Rests, not using that slovenly posture of popping their Matches into the Pan, their Muskets being on their left sides, which is not only hurtful unto themselves, but much endangers their fellow-Souldiers, and by so doing they scarce or ever do any execution against an Enemy’.62 Elton did not mean that the soldiers had the muskets on the left side of their bodies, but rather that the muskets were held with the left side of the musket downwards. The advantage of this was that it ensured the powder in the priming pan was over the touchhole and thus made ignition of the main charge more certain. That Elton was railing against a widespread practice is supported by an account from the far west of Wales. Here the Parliamentarian commander, Major General Laugherne had been reinforced by some troops from Ireland. The actions of these troops were described in a skirmish near Carmarthen in 1645. In the account they are described as ‘English, Irish foot as had somewhat before fled out of Ireland’ and then simply as ‘Irish’. This is to distinguish them from other Parliamentarian infantry and does not mean that they were of Irish nationality. ‘The Enemy very Souldier-like, had a forehand lined the hedges on the high-wayes, and approaches to the Towne, with store of Musketeers, which the Irish foot, with other seconds, beate from hedge to hedge, firing in a new dexterity, with their matches lighted in their hands, charging the enemy twice for once, which they performed with much agillity.’63 Elton, however, seems to be making the case that rapid fire did not necessarily equate with effective fire.